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Investment Reforms in a Developing Economy? 
                                                       
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The developing economies are plagued with different kinds of distortion like imperfections in the 
factor markets and product market and presence of non-traded goods, both intermediate and 
final. Several works have examined the aspect of welfare gains of trade policy and growth amidst 
domestic distortions. This includes works of Kemp and Negishi (1970), Ohyama (1972), 
Panagariya and Eaton (1979, 1982), Pravin and Panagariya (2000). The importance of such 
works has increased considerably in the liberalized economic regime because the developing 
countries have been advised by the WTO and the IMF to choose free trade as their development 
strategy. 
 
However, it has been observed that some of the developing economies, notably the non-OECD 
countries, have not implemented tariff reforms to any significant extent although they are 
vigorously executing liberalized investment policies and in fact been able to attract a huge 
amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the liberalized era.1 It is also important to mention 
that the attitude towards FDI in these economies was extremely opposite up to early 1980s the 
theoretical foundation of which was provided by the so-called ‘Brecher-Alejandro proposition’.2   
 
1
 The growth rate in absorbing FDI in the developing economies has been so fast during the recent years 
that in 2012, they have attracted more FDI flows than the developed nations accounting for 52 per cent of 
global FDI flows (World Investment Report, 2013, UNCTAD). 
2
 Brecher and Alejandro (1977) have analyzed the welfare effects of foreign capital inflow in a two-
commodity, two-factor full employment model. The important result is as follows: inflow of foreign 
capital with full repatriation of its earnings is necessarily immiserizing (i.e. welfare worsening) if the 
import-competing sector is capital-intensive and is protected by a tariff. The Brecher-Alejandro 
proposition has subsequently been re-examined in terms of three-sector models, both with or without 
unemployment, in works like Beladi and Marjit (1992a, 1992b), Khan (1982), Chandra and Khan (1993), 
but the immiserizing result of foreign capital in the presence of a tariff protected import-competing sector 
has been found to be valid in general. Hence, FDI was then viewed as an instrument of appropriation of 
economic resources of the developing economies on the part of foreign capitalists. 

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Two pertinent questions at this juncture are: (i) why are these countries taking different measures 
to woo foreign capitalists to investment in them given the standard ‘immiserizing result’. To put 
it differently, why these economies have changed their attitude towards FDI in the liberalized 
era; and, (ii) why are they not lowering their tariff rates beyond certain levels although they have 
chosen free trade as their development strategy? 
 
The present paper purports to provide answers to the above questions in terms of a two-sector 
full employment general equilibrium model with labour market distortion and an import tariff. 
Sector 1 (the informal sector) produces the export commodity with the help of two homogenous 
inputs, labour ( L ) and capital ( K ) while sector 2 (the formal sector) produces the import good 
by means of the same two inputs. There is imperfection in the labour market in sector 2 where 
workers receive a high wage, *W  while their counterparts in sector 1 receive the competitive 
wage,W with *W W> . 
 
The existence of high wage in the formal sector can be explained in different ways. However, in 
the literature on trade and development it has most commonly been explained either in terms of 
strict implementation of the minimum wage law of the government or collective bargaining on 
the part of labour unions with their employers or in terms of efficiency wage considerations of 
the employers in this sector. While Harris-Todaro (1970), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1971, 1974) 
have considered high wage in the formal sector as a consequence of government fiat, Stiglitz 
(1976) has explained it in terms of efficiency wage considerations. On the other hand, Calvo 
(1978), Quibria (1988) and Chau and Khan (2001) in the Harris-Todaro setting with urban 
unemployment have explicated that the high wage in the urban sector (formal sector) is the 
outcome of trade union behavior. It has also been found empirically that trade unionism by no 
means is an inconsequential source of wage differentials in developing countries.3 
 
3
 According to Freeman (2010) although labour unions and collective bargaining are less 
important in developing countries compared to developed ones enough unions in developing 
economies are engaged in collective bargaining. There are many studies, which have estimated 
union effects and compared outcomes between union and nonunion wages although their datasets 
are not quite large. Studies by Panagides and Patrinos (1994) and Fairris (2003, 2006) for Mexico; 
Tsafack-Nanfosso (2007) for Cameroon; Kingdon et al. (2006) for sub-Saharan African countries; 
Menezes-Filho et al. (2005) for Brazil; Blunch and Verner (2004) for Ghana; Bhandari (2008) for 


Wage determination in the models of Calvo (1978), Quibria (1988) and Chau and Khan (2001) is 
based on the monopoly trade union framework as well as on the Nash bargaining framework. 
They have derived a unionized wage function where the unionized and non-unionized wages are 
positively correlated and analyzed the consequences of different development policies on urban 
unemployment. However, they have not discussed the welfare outcomes of FDI and trade 
liberalization in the developing economies and derived conditions under which these policies 
would necessarily be harmful or beneficial. In the developing nations that are plagued with 
multiple distortions any policy changes designed to correct a particular distortion are likely to 
increase the degree(s) of other distortions.4 Hence, the net outcome on welfare is ambiguous. 
However, conditions (sufficient and/or necessary) involving system parameters can be derived 
that can ensure certain specific results. 
 
The present paper introduces endogenous labour market distortion in a 2×2 full-employment 
model where the formal-informal wage differential arises due to trade union activities in the 
formal sector industry. We have derived precise conditions for inflow of foreign capital to be 
welfare-improving in the presence or absence of any tariff distortion and for tariff reform to be 
welfare-deteriorating. Our results provide theoretical answers to certain observed phenomena in 
the developing countries. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider a two-sector, two-factor full-employment model for a small open developing 
economy with labour market imperfection in sector 2. In sector 2 (formal sector) workers receive 
the unionized wage, *W , which is determined through collective bargaining between the 
representative firm and the representative labour union in the industry. The workers in the 
    
India etc. have estimated that the union/nonunion wage differential ranges between 5% and 25% 
in these countries.    
4
 See Batra (1973) in this context. 
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informal sector receive a low competitive wage, W . Commodity prices, iP s are given by the 
small open economy assumption. There is an import tariff at the ad-valorem rate, t  on 
commodity 2 so that its domestic or tariff-inclusive price is *2P  where
*
2 2(1 )P t P= + . All other 
standard assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model including CRS with positive but 
diminishing marginal productivity to each factor are retained. Finally, commodity 1 is chosen as 
the numeraire. 
 
Since unionized wage is the source of distortion in the labour market in this model we feel the 
necessity to explain how it is determined. 
 
2.1 Determination of the unionized wage 
 
We consider a competitive formal sector industry (sector 2). Each homogeneous firm in the 
industry has a separate trade union and the unionized wage is determined through collective 
bargaining. Labour and capital are the two factors of production. The capital market facing each 
firm is perfect. Capital is perfectly mobile between the two sectors and its economy-wide return 
is r .  Although capital is another input of production in the process of determination of the 
unionized wage labour is considered to be the only variable input of production.5 Here, the 
unionized wage is determined as solution to the Nash-bargaining game between the 
representative firm and the representative labour union which would be the same across firms in 
this sector. Let us denote it by *W . After dropping capital the production function of the k th firm 
 
5
 This is in line with Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995) where while determining the ‘fair wage’ of the 
workers, w , the other variable input, Q (say, capital) has been left aside on the plea that its rate of 
return, q , is the same in both the sectors of the economy. Chaudhuri (2003), Chaudhuri and 
Mukhopadhyay (2009) and Chaudhuri and Ghosh Dastidar (2014, forthcoming) also have ignored capital 
in the process of determination of the unionized wage on the same ground. In all the above works, the 
determined unionized wage function has subsequently been fitted into the general equilibrium part of their 
models where all endogenous variables including the unionized wage are determined as functions of 
system parameters.       


in sector 2 is written as 2( ), '(.) 0; "(.) 0kQ Q L Q Q= > <  where 2L k is the number of workers 
employed by the k th  firm. 
The representative firm’s profit function is given by 
*
2 ( ) *2 2 2P Q L W Lk k kΠ = −            (1) 
where *2P is the exogenously given price of the product of the firm. 
The representative labour union maximizes the aggregate wage income of its members net of 
their opportunity wage income i.e. 
( * ) 2k W W L kΩ = −             (2) 
where, the informal sector wage,W  is the opportunity wage of the workers in sector 2.€6 This is 
because any worker failing to get employment in the formal sector has to fall back upon a job in 
the informal sector (sector 1) offering the competitive wage,W . 
 
We consider a cooperative game between the representative firm and the representative labour 
union that leads to simultaneous determination of the unionized wage, *W  and the level of 
employment, 2L k by the firm. If the two parties fail to reach an agreement no production will 
take place and the workers have to accept jobs in the informal sector. So, given the objective 
functions of the two parties, represented by equations (1) and (2), the disagreement pay-off 
vector is: [0 , 0] . 
The Nash-bargaining solution is obtained from the following optimization exercise. 
 
 
6
 This is in line with Calvo (1978), Chaudhuri (2003), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009). However, 
unlike Calvo (1978) sector 1 is here the informal sector instead of the rural sector. In the other two works, 
nevertheless, sector 1 is the informal sector. 
	

Max *2
(1 )[ ( ) * ] [( * ) ]2 2 2k
U UJ P Q L W L W W Lk k k
−
= − × −        (3) 
 *, 2W L k  
where U is the bargaining strength of the labour union.7 It may be noted that if the formal sector 
labour market were perfect there would have been no trade unionism. In that case we would 
have, 0U = .  
The first-order conditions for maximization are 
*
2(1 )[( * ) ] [ (.) * ]2 2U W W L U P Q W Lk k− − = −        (4) 
and, 
* *
2 2(1 )( (.) *) [ (.) * ]2 2U P Q W L U P Q W Lk k′− − = − −       (5) 
Using (4) and (5) one obtains 
*
2 (.)P Q W′ =            (6) 
From equation (6) the equilibrium employment in the k th firm is determined as follows.8 
*
2( , )2 2L L W Pk k=           (6.1) 
Simplification from (5) and (6) yields 
*
2 ( )2* (1 )
2
P Q L kW U U W
L k
= + −         (7)  
 
7
 However, U  is amenable to policy measures. If the government undertakes different labour market 
regulatory measures e.g. partial or complete ban on resorting to strikes by the trade unions, reformation of 
employment security laws to curb union power, U takes a lower value. 
 
8
 Each firm in industry 2 employs labour up to the point where the VMPL is exactly equal to the informal 
sector wage,W .   



With identical firms using equation (6.1) and dropping ‘ k ’ equation (7) after generalizing is 
rewritten as follows. 
*
2* *( , , )W W P W U=            (8)  
Differentiating (6) and (7) and simplifying one can easily show that 
*( ) 0
*
W
W WE
W W
∂
= >
∂
;
*
2
* *
2 2
*( ) 0
*P
PWE
P W
∂
= >
∂
; and, *( ) 0
*
U
W UE
U W
∂
= >
∂
 where 
*
2
,W P
E E and 
UE denote the elasticities of *(.)W with respect to *2,W P andU , respectively; and, 
*
2
( ) 1W PE E+ = . 
 
3. The general equilibrium analysis and results 
 
We are now going to present the general equilibrium structure of our model after fitting in the 
unionized wage function as given by (8) and show how it can be used to obtain certain 
unconventional results that explain a few observed phenomena in the developing economies 
which are plagued with different types of distortion. We consider two types of distortion, labour 
market distortion in the form of unionized wage in the formal sector and a commodity market 
distortion that takes the form of a tariff on the import-competing sector.  
 
The general equilibrium set-up is given by the following set of equations. 
1 1 1L KWa ra+ =           (9) 
*
2 2 2 2 2*( , , ) (1 )L KW P W U a ra t P P+ = + =        (10) 
1 1 2 2K K D Fa X a X K K K+ = + =         (11) 
1 1 2 2L La X a X L+ =           (12) 
where jia s is the requirement of the j th factor required to produce one unit of output of 
sector i for ,j L K= ; and, 1,2i = . The aggregate capital stock of the economy, K  consists of both 


domestic capital ( DK ) and foreign capital ( FK ) and these are perfect substitutes. The entire 
foreign capital income, FrK is repatriated.  
 
Equations (9) and (10) are the two zero-profit conditions for the two sectors while equations (11) 
and (12) are the full-employment conditions for capital and labour, respectively. We assume that 
sector 1 is more (less) labour-intensive (capital-intensive) than sector 2 in value sense i.e. 
1 2
1 2
*L L
K K
Wa W a
a a
> . As *W W>  it automatically implies that sector 1 is more (less) labour-intensive 
(capital-intensive) relative to sector 2 in physical sense.  
 
Let us now turn to the demand side of the model. 
 
The strictly quasi-concave social welfare function is given by 
1 2( , )V V D D=   (13) 
where iD  denotes the aggregate demand for the i th commodity for 1,2i = . 
 
Trade balance requires that 
1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) FX D P D X rK− = − +  
or, * *1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( ) FD P D X P X tP D X rK+ = + + − −   (14) 
where 1 1( )X D−  is the amount of 1X  exported and 2 2( )D X− denotes the amount of 2X  that is 
imported. 
 
National income at domestic prices is given by 
*
1 2 2 2 FY X P X tP M rK= + + −   (15) 
where, M denotes the volume of import of commodity 2 and is given by 
*
2 2 2( , )M D P Y X= −   (16) 


In (15), 2tP M measures the aggregate tariff revenue of the government which is transferred to 
consumers as lump-sum payments.9  
 
3.1 Welfare consequences of foreign capital inflow and trade liberalization  
 
Differentiating equations (9) – (16) and the production functions the following two expressions 
can be obtained.10 
1 2
2 2
1
1( ) ( )[( * ) ]
                       (+)
L
L
v XdV W W a tP
V dK K
λ
λ= − −
          (17) 
and, 
2
2
1 1
1
1( ) ( )[( * )( ){ (1 )}
                                           (+)                (+)
LK
W K L P
TL SdV v W W E E
V dt t
θ θ
θ
= − + −
 
                                        
22 2
2 1 2 1 1 2
( * ){ } ( ) ( ) ]
               (+)                            (+)                     (-)    
L
L K
W W a tP X A A tP Hλ λλ
− −
+ + +
    (18) 
where: ( /1 ) 0T t t= + > ; *2 2[(1 ) /{1 (1 )}] 0; ( / )v t t m m P D Y= + + − > = ∂ ∂ is the marginal 
propensity to consume commodity 2 (1 0m> > ); and, *2 2 2 2[( / ) ( / )] 0H D P D D Y= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ < is the 
Slutsky’s pure substitution term.11 
 
From equations (17) and (18) the following proposition can be established. 
 
9
 This is the standard assumption made in the theoretical literature on international trade. See Marjit and 
Beladi (1996), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009, 2014) among others. 
10
 See Appendices 1 and 2 for detailed derivations.  
11
 The expressions for 1A  and 2A have been presented in Appendix 1. 

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Proposition 1: An inflow of foreign capital improves social welfare iff 2 2( * ) LW W a tP− > . On 
the other hand, a policy of trade liberalization that lowers the rate of tariff is welfare-worsening 
if 22 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
( * )[{ } ( ) ( ) ] 0L L K
W W a tP X A A tP Hλ λλ
− −
+ + ≥ .12 
 
We explain proposition 1 as follows. An inflow of foreign capital raises the aggregate capital 
stock of the economy (domestic plus foreign) and leads to a Rybczynski effect. Sector 2 expands 
and sector 1 contracts, as the former sector is capital-intensive. As the higher wage-paying sector 
expands, both in terms of output and employment, the aggregate wage income of the workers 
increase.13 This we call the labour reallocation effect that works positively on social welfare and 
is captured by the first term in the right-hand side of equation (17). On the other hand, an 
expansion of sector 2 leads to further misallocation of economic resources, lowers volumes of 
trade thereby exerting a downward pressure on welfare. This is the cost of the tariff protection of 
the supply side.14 This can alternatively be explained as follows. Because the protected sector 
expands the volume of import of commodity 2 falls. This lowers the aggregate tariff revenue and 
hence the lump-sum transfer payments to consumers. This in turn lowers national income at 
domestic prices and produces an adverse effect on national welfare. We call it the tariff revenue 
effect that affects welfare adversely. This effect is captured by the second term in the right-hand 
side of equation (17).Welfare improves if the positive labour reallocation effect dominates over 
the negative tariff revenue effect.15  
 
 
12
 There can be other sufficient conditions under which the policy of trade liberalization might be 
welfare-worsening.  
13
 Note that the labour-output ratio, 2La has not changed as factor prices have not changed. So, an 
expansion of sector 2 implies an increase in aggregate employment, 2 2La X in this sector.  
14
 As the output of the tariff-protected sector rises the deadweight loss to the society due to further 
misallocation of economic resources goes up thereby lowering social welfare.  
15
 The possibilities of welfare gain in developing economies due to FDI have also been demonstrated by 
Marjit and Beladi (1996) and Chaudhuri (2007, 2014) among others. 

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A policy of trade liberalization, on the other hand, lessens t  and hence the tariff-inclusive 
domestic price of commodity 2, i.e. *2P . This lowers r and raisesW and hence *W  through the 
Stolper-Samuelson effect. However, the higher wage-paying sector contracts both in terms of 
output and employment due to a Rybczynski type effect that follows the Stolper-Samuelson 
effect.16 Thus, there are two components of the labour reallocation effect. As the two wage rates 
increase the aggregate wage income increases. On the contrary, as the higher (lower) wage-
paying sector contracts (expands) the aggregate wage income goes down. The net effect is, 
however, ambiguous. Finally, the consumers would be consuming more of commodity 2 leading 
to a decrease in cost of tariff protection of the demand side that works positively on welfare. 
Besides, as the protected sector contracts the efficiency of allocation of economic resources also 
improves. The cost of protection of the supply side decreases which also works favourably on 
welfare. If the net labour reallocation effect is negative and is stronger than the combined 
positive effect of the last two effects, welfare decreases due to trade liberalization. See equation 
(18).  
 
From (7) we find that the higher the bargaining strength of the labour unions i.e. the value of U  
the larger would be the intersectoral wage differential, ( * )W W−  . Then, from equations (17) and 
(18) it follows that the strength of the labour reallocation effect and hence the possibility of 
obtaining unconventional results increase with an increase in U . 
 
In the absence of any labour market imperfection, there is no trade unionism in the formal sector 
labour market. In such a situation we have 0U = . Then from equation (7) it follows that 
*W W= . Then the model boils down to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model. 
There is no labour reallocation effect. The first terms in the right-hand sides of equations (17) 
and (18) vanish and we get the following standard results: an inflow of foreign capital definitely 
 
16
 A Rybczynski type effect takes place following a Stolper-Samuelson effect if the technologies of 
production are of the variable coefficient type. This is a well-known result in the theory of international 
trade. 

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worsens welfare.17 On the other hand, a policy of trade liberalization unambiguously improves 
social welfare. This leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: In the absence of any trade unionism in the formal sector labour market, 
investment liberalization (trade liberalization) unequivocally worsens (improves) social welfare.   
 
 
4.     Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have considered a 2×2 full-employment model with labour market distortion 
where the intersectoral wage differential is explained in terms of collective wage bargaining in 
the formal sector industry with an eye to examine how the presence of labour unions can affect 
the welfare consequences of trade and investment reforms in the developing countries. We have 
demonstrated that the outcomes of these policies crucially hinge on the degree of imperfection 
prevailing in the labour market which is positively related to the bargaining strength of the trade 
unions. Our results provide theoretical answers to certain important questions like why 
developing countries are yearning for foreign capital despite the standard immiserizing result and 
why they are not reducing their tariff rates beyond certain levels even after choosing free trade as 
their development strategy. 
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